Abstract: There are many methods to make decisions under risk. All of them can be divided into two large classes: normative (or prescriptive) methods and descriptive methods. Normative methods describe how individuals have to make optimal decisions based on certain decisive rules (selection criteria). Descriptive methods use empirical evidences concerning how individuals make optimal decisions in reality. There are a number of normative methods to make decisions under risk, which we mention in the presented paper as direct methods. Another popular tool to make decisions under risk is expected utility theory. The attitude to risk of the decision-making person plays the main role in decision making under risk. Therefore, attitudes to risk have to be effectively modelled and considered in decision making procedure. In this paper we are considering and analysing approaches to modelling of attitudes to risk with use of various normative methods of decision making under risk.
Introduction
Uncertainties are around us and a part of surrounding world. It is correct both for the environment and for various fields of human activity. When will the earthquake be in seismic dangerous region? Will the next winter be colder or warmer than the previous one? These questions have not exact answers because real results depend on a large number of casual factors that cannot be forecast exactly. This statement is correct for various fields of human activity too. An individual wants to get maximal profit from investments in security portfolio. But he (she) may not get expected profit, but, moreover, may lose invested money owing to some negative factors. Treating an ill patient, the doctor should take into account that treatment result can differ from expected one owing to influence of unforeseen casual factors. If we launch a spacecraft to investigate Mars we should consider the possibility of faults and crash due to meteorite blow or other technical damage.
Actions whose results cannot be predicted with 100% assurance, are high risk actions or actions under risk conditions.
In general, risk reflects the possibility of appearance of unfavourable circumstances (results) due to casual factors and/or realisation of some casual events.
There are many risk classifications. In general, these are political, military, economical, technical, etc. Risks play a special role in decision making where outcomes of alternative decisions depend on casual events and the occurrence of some events can lead to unfavourable outcomes.
How can risk be measured? Any risk includes two components: uncertainty, connected with unfavourable results (outcomes), and losses, connected with these results (outcomes). Probabilistic estimations of chances of casual event appearance are used for estimation of uncertainty level. Real estimations, characterising losses, are used for estimation of these losses. Frequently, money estimations are used instead of real loss estimations. Expected loss estimations are used often as resulting risk estimations. In specific situations, probabilities of unfavourable outcomes are used as risk estimations. Such approach is applied often in calculations of technical system reliability. Sometimes, only potential losses are used as risk estimations.
Uncertainties and risks are objective reality. But risk perception is realised by a subjective way. The same situation one person can feel as very risky but another person -as normal. Subjective person's feeling of a risk is indicated in his (her) attitude to risk. In Hillson and Murray-Webster (2007) this concept is determined as "state of mind, mental view or disposition with regard to a fact or state". Results of wide research of attitudes to risk are presented in Weber et al. (2002) .
Decision-making persons can be classified by attitude to risk as following:
• risk averse
• risk neutral
• risk-seeking.
It is possible to estimate attitude to risk of any person by following simple way. He (she) is offered to make choice among a participation in some simple hypothetical lotteries with two outcomes and refusal from participation in lotteries with minimal satisfying compensation. Minimal compensation is called lottery certain equivalent. If person supposes his lottery certain equivalents are less than expected benefits in all lotteries, so person is not risky. Moreover, differences between benefits and certain equivalents give information about risk level of the person. The larger differences, the more risk averse person is.
For risk neutral person his lottery certain equivalents are equal or very close to expected benefits of lotteries.
As a rule, more risk-seeking person has lottery certain equivalents more than expected benefits of these lotteries. The more differences between these values, the more risk-seeking person is.
In practice, the majority of decision-making persons are risk averse but interval of risk averse values can be very wide, from strong risk averse to risk neutral attitude.
Taking into account the important role of attitude of decision-making persons in decision-making process, the modelling of attitude to risk is important integral part of efficient analysis of decisions.
At the end of section we consider the classification of decision-making tasks and methods of modelling of initial situations in decision-making tasks under risk.
By sign of presence or absence of a priori uncertainty and initial information state, decision-making tasks can be devoted into three main classes (Figure 1 ).
1 Decision-making tasks under certainty [Figure 1(а) ]. In these tasks, outcomes of alternative decisions coincide with alternative decisions because casual factors (events) that can influence on outcomes of decisions are absent. As a rule, estimation of alternative decisions in these tasks is performed by values of set of criteria. Therefore, such tasks are called multicriteria decision-making tasks under certainty.
2 Decision-making tasks under risk [Figure 1(b) ]. In these tasks set (or sets) of casual events influences on alternative decisions outcomes. It is supposed, the every set is full group of casual events and probabilities of appearance of all relevant events are known.
Initial situations of decision-making under risk can be modelled successfully with help of decision trees. Decision tree is oriented treelike graph with following nodes: decision nodes, every node corresponds to alternative decisions set; event nodes, every node corresponds to full group of casual events. Edge, which outgoing from decision node, represents one alternative decision; the edge, which outgoing from event node, represents one casual event. Every final position of the tree represents one outcome. The route from initial node to final position represents alternative decision (decisions) and event (events), which leads to given outcome. Every outcome on the decision tree has criterion estimation and probability of appearance.
Figure 1 Classification of decision-making tasks
Decision trees are not suitable for modelling of complex multi-fold situations in decision-making. In these situations it is more advisable to use influence diagrams.
Influence diagram is oriented graph with three types of nodes: decision nodes, every node represents an alternative decisions set; event nodes, every node represents a full group of casual events, and value node, which represents a set of alternative decisions outcomes. Semantics of edges in influence diagram is complex. The sense of edge depends on nodes, which are joined by this edge. More detailed information about influence diagrams is stated in Howard and Matheson (1984) , Borisov et al. (2002) and Uzhga-Rebrov (2004) .
3 Decision-making tasks under uncertainty differ from ones under risk because probabilities of relevant casual events are not given [Figure 1(c) ]. In this work we are supposing required probabilistic estimations are given or obtained by expert estimations. So, decision-making tasks under uncertainty can be transformed to decision-making task under risk. (Sometimes, in expected utility theory and its modifications, approaches to estimate of relevant probabilities in process of utility function construction are considered. We are not considering these approaches here).
In Section 2 approaches to model of attitude to risk of decision-making persons in widespread direct methods of decision-making are considered. In Section 3 problems of modelling and analysis of attitude to risk in expected utility theory is considered. Section 4 contains final notes and conclusion.
Modelling of attitude to risk in direct decision-making methods
We begin with the simple task of decision-making under risk: there are the set of alternative decisions D = {d i /i = 1,…,m}, the set (total group) of casual events E = {e j /j = 1,…n} and the set of outcomes of alternative decisions C = {c ij /i = 1,…,m, j = 1,…n}. For every casual event e j ∈ E the probability of its appearance is given P j , this probability is a probability of outcome c ij :
For every outcome c ij the criterion estimation k ij , i = 1,...,m, j = 1,...,n is given. Note, criterion estimations, concerned with expenses or other losses, are included in calculation with sign '-'. It is necessary to choice the optimal decision, taking into account the attitude to risk of decision-making person.
In all direct decision-making methods under risk, the attitude to risk of decision-making person has to be known a priori. The attitude can be evaluated by use of, for example, method of lottery certain equivalents, which is described in previous section. Then evaluated attitude to risk is modelled by use of appropriate decision-making criterion.
Let us consider widespread criteria which can be used for direct decision-making under risk.
Maxmin selection criterion
( ) max min , 1, , , 1, , .
This criterion does not require estimations of probabilities of outcomes, therefore, it can be applied for decision-making under uncertainty also. Optimal decision-making process includes next procedures:
1 For every alternative decision d i ∈ D the worst outcome is determined, that is outcome with minimal benefit, if outcomes concerned with benefits only, or outcome with maximal losses, if all outcomes or some of them concerned with losses.
2 Decision is selected as optimal if it has maximal value among set of minimal estimations of outcomes.
Selection criterion (1) can be used for optimal decision selection if decision-making person is strong risk averse.
Hurvitz' selection criterion
This criterion is linear combination of maxmin selection criterion (1) and maxmax criterion. In practice, maxmax criterion is not used for decision-making. For optimal decision-making by criterion (2) the following procedures have to be performed:
1 On basis of estimation of attitude to risk of decision-making person, the numerical value of coefficient α is assigned. The less decision-making person is risk averse, the more value α will be.
2 For every alternative decision d i ∈ D, the outcome with minimal estimation min j k ij and the outcome with maximal estimation max j k ij are determined.
3 Resulting estimations K i , i = 1…., m, are calculated as weighted sums of minimal and maximal estimations of outcomes by (2).
4 Decision d i , having maximal value of resulting estimation K i at the set of all resulting estimations, is chosen as optimal.
Use of Hurwitz' selection criterion allows to model attitude to risk in large interval from strong risk averse to strong risk-seeking. Advantage of selection criteria (1) and (2) is they do not require estimations of probabilities of outcomes. From the other side, it is defect of criteria also, because a significant part of initial information is ignored in decision-making tasks under risk. Therefore, decision-making criteria, which use all initial information about decisions, are mainly of interest.
Hermeijer's selection criterion
This criterion is a generalisation of maxmin selection criterion in lottery. For all outcomes of alternative decisions, the expected values of benefits or losses k ij p ij , i = 1, …, j = 1, …, n are calculated. The optimal decision selection is made the same way as in use of maxmin criterion but expected values are used instead of real values of benefits and losses.
Hermeijer's selection criterion can be offered to decision-making person with strong risk averse but if he (she) is trying to use all initial information about decisions.
Expected value maximisation criterion
According to this selection criterion, the expected value K i is calculated for every alternative decision d i ∈ D by whole set of outcomes. Usually, values of losses are included in calculation with sign '-'. Decision d i , having maximum of expected value K i , will be optimal. Selection criterion (4) has to be applied for risk neutral decision-making persons. Unfortunately, this criterion is often applied to risk-seeking decision-making persons unreasonably.
Disadvantage of this criterion is insensitivity of selection result to amplitudes of estimation criterion change.
Hodga-Leman's selection criterion
This criterion is linear combination of maxmin selection criterion (1) and expected value maximisation criterion (4). Contribution of every criterion is regulated by coefficient α, which reflects attitude to risk of decision-making person. The more risk averse the decision-making person, the greater the value of α and the larger the contribution in general result the maxmin selection criterion has. If decision-making person is less riskseeking, then the lower the value of α and the greater contribution in general result the expected value maximisation criterion will provide. Hodga-Leman selection criterion allows modelling a wide interval of attitude to risk from strong risk averse to risk neutral.
Selection criterion on basis of μ -σ principle
This criterion is applied in economic risk analysis, in particular, in optimal security portfolio selection. Every security can be estimated by two parameters:
where k ij -yield (positive or negative) of i-security in time j in past p ij -probability of the payment k ij in time j.
Usually estimation of expected effectiveness of securities is performed on basis of statistical data. For newly issued securities the estimation of expected effectiveness can be realised by expert way.
Standard deviation of payments
where μ i is defined from (6). Standard deviation σ i is assigned as the risk measure of i-security. If portfolio consists of n securities then expected effectiveness can be calculated as follow
where μ i is expected effectiveness of i-security x i is share of i-security in portfolio.
Standard deviation (risk measure) of portfolio can be calculated by expression Above-mentioned material allows to conclude, during use of direct decision-making methods, excluding method on basis of principle μ -σ, it is necessary a priori estimation of the attitude to risk for decision-making persons. Modelling of the attitude to risk is performed by use of appropriate decision-making criterion or by aggregative criterion regulation as in selection criteria of Hurwitz and Hodga-Leman. In specific decisionmaking tasks, namely, optimal portfolio selection, the explicit modelling of the attitude to risk of investor is realised by drawing of his (her) indifference curves in space μ p -σ p . Probability theory was born in games of chance. Fortuity required well-grounded methods to estimate chances of benefits. When basis of theory was obtained, the concept of expected benefit in game was used as effectiveness criterion. Expected benefit concept was clear and understandable for professional gamers. But while knowledge and experience are accumulated, it has become clearer, this concept contradicts to logics of reasoning in some specific circumstances. For example, Saint-Petersburg paradox: D. Bernoulli has constructed special game where gamers had to take part on basis of expected benefit maximisation principle. But, as a rule, gamers refused to take part in the game.
In order to solve the contradiction between expected benefit maximisation concept and real behaviour of gamers, D. Bernoulli in 1738 has assumed, the money utility increases not proportionally to money amount but more complex way, namely, as logarithm of amount of money. As instance, we see at Figure 3 how money utility changes with increasing of money amount, correspondingly to Bernoulli's assumption. Modern data confirms Bernoulli's assumption about logarithmic dependence of money utility on money amount is correct in some particular situations only. Function u(X) is called utility function, implying, if there is a graph or analytical expression of this function, then utility of any money amount, which can be obtained in result of some actions, can be defined.
Unfortunately, productive ideas of D. Bernoulli were forgotten a long time while in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) has published fundamental work, where they have given strict mathematical axiomatic concept of utility and defined the concept of expected utility. If requirements of simple and well-grounded axioms about preferences on sets of lotteries are correct then every outcome of alternative decision c is corresponding to real value u(c), so as ( ) ( ) . The optimal decision by expected utility maximisation criterion is decision d i ∈ D, having maximal expected utility value
Concerning to concept of utility, we have two important notes.
1 Concept of utility is subjective concept which are reflecting individual preferences of decision-making person on set of lotteries and his (her) attitude to risk (Kivetz et al., 2008; Meyer, 2007) .
2 Utility function can be constructed not only in money scale but also in any other scale of estimation criterion measurement. In this case, during utility function construction we have to take into account the kind of scale of criterion measurement (scale differences, scale relations, absolute scale).
Many practical approaches were offered for utility function construction. Wide overview of approaches is presented in Farquhar (1984) . Specific approach to utilities extraction is stated in Chaewska et al. (2000) . How are modelling the attitude to risk of decision-making person in expected utility theory? There is sole answer: the attitude to risk is modelled by form of utility function. Three charts of utility function are presented on Figure 4 . Chart (1) corresponds to risk averse decision-making person, chart (2) corresponds to risk neutral decision-making person and chart (3) corresponds to risk-seeking decisionmaking person.
For risk averse decision-making person the difference between utility of expected benefit in any lottery and expected utility of this benefit will always positive
For risk neutral decision-making person the difference will be equal to 0
For risk-seeking decision-making person the difference will always negative
General factors which are influencing on risk selection results are the following:
• amplitude of variations of estimations of outcomes
• probabilities of estimations of outcomes
• rate values in selection relatively to available resources of person.
Let us analyse the influence of these factors in details. Let us call lottery as 'strict lottery' if it has two outcomes, probability of each outcome is equal to 0.5 and estimations of outcomes are equal by absolute value but have inverse signs.
Suppose, decision-making person has constructed his (her) utility function on the set of some hypothetical money sums X, the chart is presented on Figure 5 . Suppose, the person has some money x 0 , that is his (her) initial 'rich'. The person has to make choice between alternative actions:
1 to take part in lottery L 1 : (a, 0.5; -a, 0.5) 2 to take part in lottery L 2 : (2a, 0.5; -2a, 0.5) 3 to decline the participation in both lotteries.
Suppose the person has decided to take part in lottery L 1 . If he (she) will take win then his (her) current 'rich' will become equal to x 0 + a, and in opposite case his (her) current 'rich' will become equal to x 0 -a. If person has decided to take part in lottery L 2 , then his (her) current 'rich' will become equal to x 0 + 2a, or x 0 -2a. Outcomes of lotteries are presented on horizontal axis X at 
It is obvious that in this situation, expected values of lotteries cannot be a reason to select one of them preferably.
Expected utility values for every lottery can be calculated so (see Figure 5) ( ) 
It is obvious, with given form of utility function (person is risk averse) Eu(L 1 ) > Eu(L 2 ). The explanation is following. Utility growth in lottery L 1 on interval (x 0 + a) will be less than utility reduction on interval (x 0 -a) due to a property of relative reduction of utility if values of X increase. This effect appears more in lottery L 2 due to large variation of values of benefit and loss in relation to x 0 .
In any case, expected values of utility of lotteries were negative. As negative value Eu(L 1 ) is less than negative value Eu(L 2 ), the person has to prefer to take part in lottery L 1 rather than lottery L 2 .
Renunciation of participation in lotteries makes person 'alone with his (her) interests' as far as expected utility of renunciation is equal to 0. Because expected utilities of participation in lotteries are negative, the optimal action of person in this situation is renunciation of participation in lotteries.
Risk averse person can even agree to pay some money to renounce participation in risk enterprise. So, maximal money at Figure For lottery L 2 we have similar proportion, determining maximal money can be paid by person for renunciation of participation in lottery L 2 (see Figure 5 )
It is obvious, β > α. This speaks about increasing in general case, with increasing of amplitude of deviations of estimations of outcomes in risk lottery (game). This statement can be correctly applied to any decision-making tasks under risk. For example, in practice, calculation of prices in insurance policies is based on person's readiness to pay money in order to save from risks (or risk reduction).
Let consider how probabilities of outcomes can influence on results of risky selections. Suppose above-mentioned lotteries are formulated as following How can the change of probabilities of outcomes influence on result of selection among lotteries? Let us calculate expected values of lotteries.
( ) ( ) ( )
We may confidently conclude, the lottery L 1 is more preferable than lottery L 2 , without use of expected value maximisation principle and do not apply expected utility maximisation principle even. Expected utilities for lotteries are calculated so
It's easy to demonstrate that the expected utilities of these lotteries are less than the expected utilities of the above-mentioned lotteries. In the considered situation, benefit utilities are reducing largely but loss utilities are increasing greatly. As in previous case, lottery L 1 is preferable to lottery L 2 . But utility of renunciation of participation in lotteries is increasing larger now. Therefore, person can agree to pay more money to renounce from participation in lotteries in comparison with the previous situation of selection. (All relevant calculated values can be easily determined if concrete numeric values are given on measure scale X. But we refuse the use of numerical examples in order to consider objective laws on the whole).
Consider one more variant of lotteries.
Calculate expected values of lotteries.
( )
Using expected value maximisation criteria, the lottery L 2 is preferable now, and both lotteries are preferable to the renunciation of participation in lotteries. Expected utilities of these lotteries are equal
, and, further, participation in lottery L 2 is preferable. It is clear, also, the renunciation of participation in lotteries is the least preferable variant according to expected utility maximisation criterion. How can the risk averse level be estimated formally for decision-making person if his (her) utility function was being constructed on a set of values of estimation criterion X? To simplify the task, let suppose X reflects some moneys which person possesses or can possess potentially. Such argumentation with money prevails in works devoted to expected utility. The reason is in clear interpreted results, achieved on hypothetical lotteries (games). Conclusions, which were obtained in further analysis, can be used completely on any scale of a measurement of the estimation criterion X.
Arrow-Pratt's estimation of absolute risk averse is most suitable for formal estimation of risk averse (Pratt, 1964) .
This equation is general. If estimation is performed for concrete value x 0 ∈ X, equation (13.а) becomes the following In some cases, the original utility function can be presented in a appropriate analytical form with defined parameters. We will not consider how to construct the analytical function that presents the original utility function by the best way. Instead, we will consider some general classes of functions which can be used for analytical presentation of marginal utility functions and describe calculations for Arrow-Pratt's estimation r(X) for every class of function.
• quadratic form of utility function
Estimation r(X) for this class of utility functions is calculated by expression
The dependence of estimation of absolute risk aversion r(X) on level of risk aversion of decision-making persons
For decision-making person with such utility function the absolute risk aversion is increasing according to X growth.
Logarithmic utility function
For decision-making person with such utility function the absolute risk aversion is reducing according to X growth.
Exponential utility function
For decision-making person with such utility function the absolute risk aversion is constant for all interval of values X. Besides absolute risk averse estimations (13.a, 13.b) the estimation of relative risk aversion is used Hence, simple and important conclusion is: rich people agree to pay less for renunciation of participation in risky enterprises. On the contrary, poor people agree to pay more for renunciation of participation in risky enterprises. From viewpoint of logics, rich people are less worried about losing money, but for poor people the possibility of money loss in risky enterprise is very undesirable therefore, as a rule, they are trying not to risk.
For more detailed analysis of attitude to risk in expected utility theory we enter the next formal definitions. Let be two casual variables X and Y. If these variables have same expected values, they may be ordered on risk level with help of next definition (Rotshild and Stiglitz, 1970) . "For X and Y with the same mean, Y is a general mean preserving increase in risk or mean preserving spread (MPS) of X, if
Further research had shown the risk increasing definition (21) does not correctly correspond to real actions of persons. More suitable definition is offered in Quiggin (1992) . "For X and Y with the same mean Y is a monotone mean preserving spread (MMPS) with regard to X, if
1 "Decision maker (DM) has weak risk aversion (WRA), if, for any random variable X of Ψ, he prefer random variable X , its expected value E(X) with certainty:
(In this definition and further, Ψ is a set of maps of sets of alternative decisions and sets of casual events (states of nature) in set of outcomes of alternative decisions).
2 "A DM has strong risk aversion (SRA), if for any pair random variables X, Y in Ψ. Y being mean preserving spread (MPS) of X, he always prefers
As it is emphasised in Cohen (2008) , "Intuitively, these two notions capture distinct behaviours: a DM may want to avoid completely risk when possible, but when he cannot do so and has to choose between two situations there he cannot avoid risk, he could choose the riskier one, hoping to get the best consequences". Note, this behaviour is typical for persons are caused to selection in specific situations, for example, in situation of selection known as Allais paradox. Also, this behaviour contradicts to normative requirements of expected utility theory. Analysis of behaviour of persons in selection situation, which are similar to Allais paradox, led to development of new descriptive decision-making theories.
3 "A DM has monotone risk aversion (MRA), if for any pair of random variables X, Y of Ψ with Y monotone mean preserving spread (MMPS) of X, he always prefers X to
Among above-mentioned attitudes to risk, namely, risk aversion, there are following dependencies (Cohen, 2008) 
Strong Risk Aversion → Monotone Risk Aversion → Weak Risk Aversion
In expected utility function these dependencies lead to next conclusion (Cohen, 2008) Strong Risk Aversion → Monotone Risk Aversion → Weak Risk Aversion →
Concavity of u
Finally, two important conclusions are obtained:
1 In expected utility theory it's impossible to distinctly separate determinations of risk aversion. This is result of the normative sense of the theory.
2 Attitude to risk in expected utility theory is modelled by the form of utility function only. This is strong confirmation of above-mentioned a priori statement about correlation of attitude to risk and form of utility function.
Final notes
In present work the approaches to modelling of attitude to risk of decision-making persons in direct decision-making methods under risk and in expected utility theory are considered. Modelling of attitude to risk is important part of effective analysis of decisions. In basis of all criteria of decision-making under risk, there are subjective preferences of decision-making persons on sets of criterion estimations of outcomes of alternative decisions and their attitude to risk. The effective choice of decisions is impossible without correct modelling and consideration of attitude to risk. In all direct decision-making methods the attitude to risk of decision-making persons have to be estimated a priori, and, based on results of this estimation, the suitable decision-making criterion is applied or aggregative decision-making criterion is regulated -this is realised for Hurwitz' criterion and Hodga-Leman's criterion.
In expected utility theory the modelling of attitude to risk of decision-making persons is performed during utility function construction process. Form of concrete utility function reflects explicitly the attitude to risk of concrete decision-making person. After transformation of criterion estimations of outcomes in estimations of utility, the selection of optimal decision is made with help of expected utility maximisation criterion.
Although direct decision-making methods and expected utility theory have been successfully used for a long time they are continuously developed further. Thus, all decision-making methods, which are considered in present work, have appropriate fuzzy versions, permitting select successfully optimal decisions in cases of fuzzy probabilities of relevant casual events and/or fuzzy criterion estimations of outcomes. Moreover, it is possible to make effective selection of optimal decisions in cases when casual events have fuzzy form (events are given as linguistic variables).
All decision-making methods in present work are normative. From one side, this feature allows to formulate simple selection criteria that have strict logical foundation and understandable for all persons in decision-making process. From other side, the attempt to restrict human thinking by strict normative framework is not always successful. In specific circumstances people make decisions not based on strict rules but in accordance with intuition and subjective experience.
After the appearance of expected utility theory, there was reasonable criticism about weak sides of theory. Main weakness of this theory is a fact that any utility function expresses subjective preferences of decision-making persons in relation to criterion estimations of alternative decisions outcomes and his (her) attitude to risk. Such double role of utility functions in specific circumstances can lead to unsatisfactory results.
Other weakness of expected utility theory is a linear dependence of expected utility values for alternative decisions on probabilities of outcomes. This is essentially reducing the capability of theory to adapt specific conditions of selection.
Complete overview of advantages and weaknesses of expected utility theory is presented in Schoemaker (1982) .
Attempts to eliminate weaknesses of expected utility theory have led to development of alternative descriptive theories of decision-making under risk, for example, rankdependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1982) and perspective theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1978; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) .
However, direct decision-making methods and expected utility theory remain powerful tools of effective decision-making under risk. Successful application of normative decision-making methods under risk is useless without effective modelling of attitudes to risk of decision-making persons, which is the main sense of this work.
